Ms. Yuxin Huang
Sydney AI Centre, The University of Sydney
ECCV 2026 Workshop @ Malmö, Sweden
Recent advances in diffusion models have revolutionized video generation, enabling the generation of high-quality videos. Both open-source and commercial models have shown increasingly impressive results. These models enable users to specify the subject of the generated video, a capability commonly referred to as video customization. Such customization typically follows two approaches. Tuning-based methods fine-tune a video diffusion model on a small set of video clips, for example, using Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA), and can then generate diverse new videos. Reference-based methods, such as image-to-video (I2V) models, take a reference image and a text prompt, offering pixel-level control.
However, these models raise serious concerns about about personal privacy, identity ownership, and intellectual property protection. A malicious user can collect public video clips of a target person and exploit current models to generate misleading or harmful content about that person: not only by finetuning a video diffusion model on the whole collection through tuning-based customization, but also by extracting a single frame from any of these videos as the reference image for reference-based customization. These threats may lead to fake news and violations of portrait rights. Protecting video content from being misused thus becomes a pressing concern.
Existing anti-diffusion works have been mostly developed in the image domain, covering both tuning-based customization of T2I models and reference-based I2I editing. Protection on the video side, however, has received much less attention: the few existing efforts target only reference-based I2V pipelines, while protection against the tuning-based customization of T2V models remains unexplored. This leaves a critical gap, since tuning-based customization is another pathway through which a malicious user can exploit.
Participants are given collections of short, face-centric video clips of individuals and must return protected (“unlearnable”) versions of those clips. The goal is that, if a malicious attacker takes the protected clips and runs them through diffusion-based video customization, the generated videos either fail to reproduce the target identity or fail to follow the attacker's text prompt, while the protected clips remain perceptually close to the originals. We consider the two customization threats below.
A submission is a set of protected videos in one-to-one correspondence with the released set: only pixel values may change (resolution and frame count are preserved), within a specified perturbation budget.
The competition uses three evaluation tracks:
Phase 1 — Preliminary Round (open to all teams)
Phase 2 — Final Round (top teams from Phase 1)
All deadlines are in Anywhere on Earth (AoE) time.
Submissions are judged on two criteria: protection effectiveness (measured on the generated videos) and imperceptibility (measured on the protected videos against the originals).
Sydney AI Centre, The University of Sydney
Mohamed Bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen)
Mohamed Bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence
We are actively seeking sponsors and industry partners to support the LifeGenIP Competition at ECCV 2026. Organizations interested in contributing prizes, compute resources, or other forms of support are warmly invited to contact the organizing committee at lifegenip_workshop@googlegroups.com.
For workshop coordination, submission questions, speaker-related inquiries, and sponsorship opportunities, please contact the organizing committee: lifegenip_workshop@googlegroups.com